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The aim of the present paper is to provide an elucidation of the commitments and 
motivations of phenomenal disjunctivism. Such an elucidation is very much needed, 
for, as far as i can see, the view, originally introduced by m.g.f. martin, is often 
misconstrued. even though what follows is not a direct defence of the view, this 
elucidation will dispel some objections, as these will turn out to simply misconceive 
their target.
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‘disjunctivism’ is the name of a variety of accounts of experience that share a 
broad aim and a common polemical target. the common aim is the defence of 
naïve realism (nr), the view according to which perceiving is being acquainted 
with mind-independent objects. the shared negative thesis is the rejection of the 
common Kind assumption (cKa), namely the claim that veridical perceptions, 
illusions and hallucinations are mental events of the same fundamental kind. 
the two points are connected, for the cKa seems incompatible with nr: in 
fact, the well-known argument from hallucination against nr hinges on the 
cKa. the argument is a reductio ad absurdum of nr and runs as follows:
1. nr claims that experiencing (at least in certain cases) is being 
sensorially conscious of mind-independent objects.
2. in a case of perfect hallucination, one has an experience that is 
introspectively indistinguishable from an experience one may have 
in a veridical case.
3. in a case of perfect hallucination, there is no mind-independent 
object one is aware of.
hence:
4.  in the case of perfect hallucination, one is not conscious of 
mind-independent objects.
5. two experiences which introspectively appear the same must be 
fundamentally identical and require the same account.
hence:
6. nr cannot be true.
the crucial step is premise 5, where the cKa allows a generalisation from 
the intermediate conclusion that nr cannot be true for hallucinations 
to all cases of perceptual experience, on the basis of the idea that, if two 
experiences are indistinguishable, as a perception and a hallucination might 
be, they must require the same account.
disjunctivism contends that the argument from hallucination is fallacious 
because the cKa is unmotivated, as indistinguishability doesn’t imply 
identity. even if a perception and a hallucination might be introspectively 
indistinguishable, they do not need to share any essential core, or be identical in 
any fundamental way.1 
1  notice that what disjunctivism denies as common between perception and hallucination is not 
physiological (see hinton 1973, 75), so a disjunctivist is willing to accept that sometimes a perception and a 
hallucination can be realized by the same physiological brain state.
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it is possible to spell out this refusal of the cKa in different ways. according 
to a familiar taxonomy, disjunctivism comes in both epistemological 
and metaphysical varieties (see byrne and logue 2008). epistemological 
disjunctivism, chiefly proposed by McDowell, claims that veridical 
perception provides perceptual evidence which isn’t available in the case of 
a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. 
metaphysical disjunctivism comes in at least two further sub-varieties (see 
haddock and macpherson 2008; Soteriou 2009): experiential disjunctivism, 
propounded by Snowdon,2 and phenomenological disjunctivism, most 
famously proposed by m.g.F. martin.3 experiential disjunctivism challenges the 
widespread assumption (supporting the causal theory of perception, Snowdon’s 
target) whereby the object of perception (whether veridical or illusory) is always 
extrinsic to the inherent nature of experience. by contrast, Snowdon claims 
that an experience is either a state of which the intrinsic nature is not possible 
to characterise without mentioning the object perceived or a state which is 
“intrinsically independent of the surrounding objects” (Snowdon 1980-1, 186). 
this paper will focus on phenomenal disjunctivism, which is generally 
deemed more radical than the other versions of disjunctivism and, as 
such, more exposed to criticism. Phenomenal disjunctivism (Pd) casts 
the difference between perception and a subjectively indistinguishable 
hallucination in terms of a difference in their phenomenal character, 
while epistemic and experiential disjunctivism more modestly claim 
respectively that perception and hallucination have different epistemic 
roles, or that they are distinct concepts which cannot be explained by 
reference to a more fundamental common concept.
PD has provoked puzzlement and criticism. Many find disjunctivism committed 
to self-contradiction. it grants that a perception and hallucination be 
indistinguishable and yet still have different phenomenal characters. however, 
it is widely assumed that, by definition, if two experiences are subjectively 
indistinguishable4 then they must have the same phenomenal character.  
2 also hinton, hailed as the inventor of disjunctivism, could be seen as a proponent of this 
variety of disjunctivism. 
3 the label “phenomenal disjunctivism” is not due to martin himself, who has often expressed 
discontent with it. martin (2013) proposes the label “evidential disjunctivism”. however, here i will 
conform to the widespread and better known label “phenomenal disjunctivism”. brewer (2011, 
110), campbell (2002, 116) and Fish (2008 and 2009) have endorsed similar views, and Sturgeon 
(2008) claimed that disjunctivism is better formulated in these terms. however, unlike martin, in 
Fish and Sturgeon’s accounts, hallucination doesn’t simply have a different phenomenal character 
from perception, it has no phenomenal character at all. moreover, instead of characterizing 
hallucination in terms of its indistinguishability from perception, they characterise it in terms of 
the cognitive effect that they share with a relevant perception. in order to avoid complications, 
here i will focus solely on martin’s approach.
4 this in virtue of the widespread equation of phenomenal character and “what-it-is-likeness”, whose 
mark is being accessible through introspection. See for instance levine (2003, 57) and chalmers (2006, 50).  
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an easy response available for the phenomenal disjunctivist is to reduce the 
disagreement to a disagreement over terminology. When she claims that the 
phenomenal character of a hallucination is indistinguishable from a perception, 
of course she does not take “phenomenal character” to mean just “what it is 
like to have an experience”, but something different, something in which the 
presence of the relevant object of experience matters and makes the difference. 
After all, “phenomenal disjunctivism“ is a  term of art and its definition is a 
matter open to decision. 
but this reply is surely too swift. clearly phenomenal disjunctivists don’t accept 
the assumption that, if two experiences are indistinguishable, then they must 
ipso facto share the same phenomenal character. if this is really a consequence 
of the definition of phenomenal character, then they can nothing but reject it. 
However, this cannot be reduced to a terminological issue. A different definition 
of “phenomenal character” would reflect a substantial disagreement in the way 
this important feature of perception is understood.  this disagreement about 
the nature of phenomenal character is indeed the real core of the phenomenal 
disjunctivists’ proposal and hence must be motivated and argued for. 
We cannot understand the sense of phenomenal character proposed by Pd 
without considering a further claim within martin’s proposal: the negative view 
of hallucination (nvh), whereby at least some possible hallucinations have no 
positive psychological or mental features that account for their phenomenal 
character. this addition may make martin’s view appear even more extreme and 
implausible.5 
i will argue that nvh is not an oddity added to an already odd enough view, 
as it is often depicted. on the contrary, it is inseparable from Pd, and it is 
what ultimately allows us to understand that Pd is not committed to any 
self-contradictory claim.
Why does martin specify the difference between perception and hallucination 
in terms of a difference in their phenomenal characters? to him, this is a direct 
consequence of what he takes to be nr, a thesis that he describes as follows:
“according to nr, the actual objects of perception [...] partly constitute one’s 
conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience” (martin 2004, 93)
martin conceives nr in phenomenological terms, that is to say as a claim about 
“how experience seems to us to be just through introspection”. in this sense nr 
is, for him, the default view (martin 2004, 46) because it’s based on a conception 
5 the combination of Pd and nvh has come to be known as “extreme disjunctivism”, after a 
label introduced in Smith (2008). 
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of perception we acquire just through reflection upon it, with no further 
assumption or reasoning.
We intuitively take our experience to be an experience of worldly objects, and 
the changes in what it is like to have an experience seem to vary according to 
how the scene presented varies:
“When one reflects on one’s experience it seems to one as if one is [...] presented 
with some experience-independent elements of the scene before one as 
constituents of one’s experience and not merely as represented to one as in 
imagination.” (martin 2004, 49).
the objects are said to constitute and determine the experience not in the 
way that bricks compose a wall, but in the sense that being aware of mind-
independent objects and their properties is part of what it is like to have an 
experience. 
nr is therefore the default view because it simply endorses the way in which 
experience subjectively strikes us. being the default view, nr doesn’t really 
need to be argued for; all we need is to show that nr doesn’t fall under the 
pressure of arguments aimed at proving it false. moreover, for martin, a theory 
which takes at face value the way in which experience strikes us has a strong 
advantage over theories which take a different approach. conversely, any theory 
that denies that experience is the way in which it strikes us is liable to lead to 
humean skepticism about the senses. according to humean skepticism about 
the senses, if the knowledge of the world is based on a conception of experience 
which turns out to be false, then one’s claim to that knowledge seems to be 
undermined. as a result, we seem to be cut off from the world because we lack 
the kind of contact that we supposed ourselves to have with it. 
because nr “seeks to give an account of phenomenal consciousness” (martin 
1997, 97), disjunctivism “is intended to have a direct bearing on one’s account 
of what it is like for the subject to be perceiving.” (martin 1997, 97). if the 
phenomenal character of an experience is partly constituted by objects, and in 
a hallucination ex hypothesis there is no object one can be aware of, then the 
phenomenal character of hallucination cannot be determined and constituted 
by the objects perceived.
but what then does determine and constitute the phenomenal character of 
a hallucination? martin’s response is, strictly speaking, nothing (hence the 
negative view). or, better: the fact that what it is like to have such an experience is 
indiscriminable from what it is like to have a corresponding veridical perception.
the phenomenal consciousness of subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations 
is provided by their being “essentially failure they purport to relate us to the 
world while failing to do so” (Martin 2006, 372); and this is the most specific 
thing one can say about hallucinations.
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again, this has provoked no little perplexity. how can the phenomenal 
character of a hallucination be determined only by an epistemic condition, 
such as being indiscriminable from another experience? Siegel (2004) and 
Smith (2008) have objected that the epistemic conception is enough to 
highlight the cognitive content of hallucination, but it is completely useless 
for explaining its sensory, felt character, that is to say its phenomenal 
consciousness. a more intrinsic feature is needed in order to explain 
phenomenal consciousness.
according to martin, this line of objection arises only within a certain way 
of conceiving phenomenal consciousness as 
some special stuff which gets added to the thoughts and other mental 
elements in order to engender subjectivity […] Something conceivable 
independently [and] prior to [...] self-consciousness which acts as the 
ground for it (martin 1998).
Under this understanding of phenomenal consciousness, martin’s nvh 
seems to introduce a form of philosophical zombie, who may have thoughts 
and possess the ability to make judgments about phenomenal consciousness, 
but lacks phenomenal consciousness per se.  but, for martin, this is a 
misleading way of thinking of phenomenal character. the real matter 
of disagreement between martin and his opponents is not whether we 
have to count one (just experience as a common kind) or two (perception 
and hallucination) in the taxonomy of mental states. their deepest 
disagreement concerns the nature of phenomenal consciousness and the 
role of introspection.
For the “special stuff” view,6 the phenomenal character is typically something 
added to the representational content of an experience, or to its functional and 
cognitive role, a mental ingredient or property of the experience which gives it 
its distinct “flavour”, its “ what it is like”, which only the experiencer can know 
6  this tentative label “special stuff“ might lead one to think that only proponents of qualia 
(special properties of experience) can be credited with this view, while people who deny the 
existence of qualia, like strong representationalists, aren’t are liable to this criticism. however, 
the fundamental feature of the special stuff view isn’t a metaphysical claim about what 
constitutes phenomenal character, rather it is the idea that phenomenal character is something 
that can be tracked through introspection and whose existence and nature is independent 
from reflection upon it. I am inclined to think that the debate on qualia arises in the context 
of representationalism precisely because representationalists think of phenomenal character 
in this way, as something that introspection can track in the same way that we track external 
objects. this induces the idea that in order to account for this trackable stuff something more 
than the representational content is needed, and as such qualia were introduced. alternatively, 
representationalists are forced to explain how this stuff could be “absorbed“ by representational 
content. of course this diagnosis would need to be supported by textual evidence and argued for, 
but this will hopefully be material for another paper.
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through introspection. In this view, the nature of phenomenal character is reified 
and we seem to have to indicate some “special stuff” in the mind that generates 
phenomenal consciousness. 
this conception of phenomenal character is generally introduced through 
arguments that appeal to the reader’s common sense. When one perceives, 
one doesn’t only come to know facts about the world, but one also acquires 
awareness about what it is like to be in the experiential state one is in. this 
further information must be due to certain special properties of experience, 
or phenomenal properties. Phenomenal consciousness is therefore 
conceived as an “objectivity tracked through introspection” (martin 
2006, 393). this understanding of phenomenal character is presented as 
something obvious, something that everybody should acknowledge only on 
the basis of reflection on their conscious life. 
let us concede that there is indeed an intuitive understanding of phenomenal 
character we can start from. let us also assume that we can spell out this 
intuitive understanding in terms of “what-it-is-likeness”, or of what is in the 
reach of introspection (whatever this might mean). Still, this doesn’t support 
the substantial understanding of phenomenal character assumed here, as 
requiring some special mental glow. 
What else is contained in the intuitive grasp of the notion of phenomenal 
character? What can we safely say about what it is subjectively like to have 
an experience?  the answer to this question brings us to the feature of 
transparency:7 if we are to describe how our experience strikes us, we will 
have to pay attention to the features of the objects we see. in other words, our 
introspective knowledge of what it is like to have an experience is derivative 
of our knowledge of what the things we perceive look like.
the “special stuff” view of phenomenal character overlooks this 
indissolubility between what we come to know about the properties of the 
objects and what we come to know about the properties of  the experience 
itself when it claims that any phenomenally conscious state must possess 
some special feature, something eminently subjective and private, without 
which the subject couldn’t be said to be sensorily conscious.
now, martin suggests that nothing like that is required for a subject to be 
sensorily conscious. Phenomenal consciousness is just a matter of “having a 
point of view on the world”, and having a point of view on the world is a matter 
of both being sensorily conscious and being aware of what one is conscious 
of. there is no need to postulate further mental qualities that constitute this 
phenomenal character.
7 See martin (2002).
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of course, this doesn’t yet dispel the problem faced by the disjunctivist, 
since, even if one can accept this account of phenomenal experience for 
the good case, this doesn’t seem plausible when it comes to hallucinations: 
in a perfect hallucination there is no relevant physical object, no part of 
the world on which one can have a perspective. however, it is important to 
notice that the disagreement about the way we make sense of phenomenal 
consciousness is prior to this specific problem about hallucination, and only 
if we appreciate the scope of this disagreement about phenomenal character 
in the veridical case can we make sense of the nvh. 
When it comes to hallucinations, subjects also have a perspective on the 
world “precisely [in virtue of] meeting the relevant condition for the 
negative epistemological property“ (martin 2006, 378). in this case the 
perspective on the world fails “since ex hypothesi perfect hallucination 
does not provide one with any awareness of the environment.” (martin 
2006, 378). We don’t need anything else than the negative property of 
being indiscriminable from the relevant perceptual situation for having an 
(alleged) perspective on the world and hence a phenomenology:
“appeal to further facts over and above those which provide for their 
subjectivity and for there to be something it is like for them to be so would 
thereby be redundant.” (martin 2006, 378).
We can better appreciate this point if we consider that, in martin’s proposal, 
the NVH is first of all a negative view of experience as a common kind: 
not only the notion of hallucination, but also the notion of experience can 
be characterised only by reference to perception. having a phenomenal 
experience, according to martin, is being in a state which is subjectively 
indistinguishable from a state in which mind-independent objects are made 
manifest. this feature can apply both to perception (this is tautological, as 
a perception is always indistinguishable from itself) and to hallucination 
(which is defined only by reference to perception). However, even if 
indistinguishability from perception is a common feature across perception 
and hallucination, it is not the most fundamental feature of both states: it 
is the fundamental characteristic of hallucination, but it is not the most 
fundamental characteristic of perception, whose most fundamental feature 
is its phenomenal character being partly constituted by external objects. in 
other words, having a phenomenally conscious experiential state is either 
being related to an object or being in a state which is as if one were related to 
an object. 
the core idea here is that the notion of experience lacks any autonomous 
explanatory role and depends on the notion of perception: if we are to 
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understand what it is to have an experience, we don’t have to indicate some 
special property or occurrence of the mind, we simply think of all those states 
we treat as perceptions. Sensory consciousness is not a matter of having some 
inner glow that one is aware of in introspection, it is rather, in martin’s words, 
a matter of having a perspective on the world. and having a perspective 
on the world is either being in contact with objects (perception) or being 
in a state which is indistinguishable from the latter (hallucination). if one 
considers the negative view this way, saying that hallucination has no positive 
psychological feature doesn’t have to lead us to the idea that perception, on 
the contrary, has some intrinsic and mysterious psychological feature hat is 
responsible for our being conscious. if this were so, the lack of this property in 
hallucination would indeed make its conscious character inexplicable. but the 
positive mental character of veridical experience is just being related to the 
world: a mental feature which is directed outwards. 
We can now come back to our initial worry: whether martin’s proposal 
is committed to a self-contradictory claim. given the negative view of 
experience, it is conceivable for a perception and a hallucination to be 
phenomenally indistinguishable while not sharing the same phenomenal 
character. 
the purported incompatibility of these two claims relies on the assumption 
that being indistinguishable and having the same phenomenal character 
is one and the same thing. For martin this equation seems compelling only 
if we think of phenomenal character as a special stuff that we can track 
through introspection: if two experiences are indistinguishable there must 
be something (the phenomenal character) which is identical. but if we stick 
with the intuitive understanding of the phenomenal character as what 
it is like to be in that state, this substantial view is a further unjustified 
assumption. it is hence conceivable to give phenomenal character itself 
a disjunctive understanding: in certain cases the phenomenal character 
is (partly) determined by the objects one is aware of from a certain point 
of view, in other cases it is specified by its indistinguishability from the 
perception one would have if one were presented with an object of that kind. 
both cases have a phenomenology, i.e. a phenomenal character, even if these 
are to be accounted for in different ways. this is not to say that they do not 
share a phenomenal nature, as far as they are indistinguishable. Still, this 
indistinguishability doesn’t indicate that there is some substantive mental 
event or property that they share. 
i will conclude with a discussion of a possible criticism. the strategy adopted 
here in order to make sense of Pd relies on an understanding of phenomenal 
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character which overtly assumes a central claim of nr (as understood by 
martin): it is assumed that, at least in certain cases, the very singular objects 
one perceives constitute the phenomenal character of an experience. We 
know that disjuntivism is generally introduced in defence of nr. it might 
seem, hence, that our defence of Pd begs the question, because it assumes nr, 
while the latter is precisely what ultimately needs to be justified.   
this kind of criticism misconstrues the nature of the relation between 
nr and Pd.  it is true that Pd is introduced in order to defend nr, but this 
doesn’t mean that that disjunctivism figures as a premise in an argument 
for nr. disjunctivism is not meant to provide any motivation for nr. its 
unique role is blocking a specific line or argument against NR, namely the 
argument from hallucination.8 So, it is true that disjunctivism entirely 
assumes nr: more than that, disjunctivism should be seen as a consequence 
of nr. of course, if nr turns out to be ill-motivated, then disjunctivism will 
be unnecessary. but the independent reasons for nr9 are not to be looked for 
in the disjunctive approach.
8 to be more precise, Pd is introduced in response to a particular causal version of the 
argument, which is in turn introduced in support of the cKa on which the argument in its 
general form relies. here, for the sake of simplicity, we have avoided entering into these details. 
9 Some motivations have been mentioned above in relation to the transparency of experience 
and the desire to avoid an error theory of perception.
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